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Abstract. In previous work, we developed a single Evolutionary Algorithm (EA) to
solve random instances of the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld (AAG) key exchange protocol over
polycyclic groups. The EA consisted of six simple heuristics which manipulated strings.
The present work extends this by exploring the use of hyper-heuristics in group-theoretic
cryptology for the first time. Hyper-heuristics are a way to generate new algorithms
from existing algorithm components (in this case the simple heuristics), with the EAs
being one example of the type of algorithm which can be generated by our hyper-heuristic
framework. We take as a starting point the above EA and allow hyper-heuristics to build
on it by making small tweaks to it. This adaptation is through a process of taking the EA
and injecting chains of heuristics built from the simple heuristics.
We demonstrate we can create novel heuristic chains, which when placed in the EA cre-
ate algorithms which out-perform the existing EA. The new algorithms solve a markedly
greater number of random AAG instances than the EA for harder instances. This suggests
the approach could be applied to many of the same kinds of problems, providing a frame-
work for the solution of cryptology problems over groups. The contribution of this paper
is thus a framework to automatically build algorithms to attack cryptology problems.
1. Introduction
On NP-hard problems, the time taken to produce an algorithm to solve such problems is
often vast. In such cases, users may use an “off the shelf” algorithm to obtain approximate
solutions within an appropriate time. In this paper, we take a different approach and
attempt to design an algorithm in response to feedback from similar instances of the problem.
Examples of such problems are those in group-theoretic cryptology (multiple conjugacy,
Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld (AAG, [1]) and word decomposition, for instance). These problems
have been posed over varying types of groups serving as the base problems for key exchange
protocols (KEPs) [2, 1, 32, 15, 30] and subsequently attacked [19, 20, 17, 12, 13, 33, 34,
35, 39]. The group structures used are often intended to provide an extra encryption layer
through the scrambling induced by the group presentation.
Key words and phrases: Evolutionary algorithms, polycyclic groups, cryptography, Anshel-Anshel-
Goldfeld key exchange protocol, high performance computing, hyper-heuristic, machine learning.
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In this work, a preliminary hyper-heuristic framework is detailed which takes as input
a proposed cryptographic base problem and a group structure, and, via machine learning
techniques, generates operations for a length attack algorithm which aims to solve an ac-
ceptable proportion of random instances of the problem. The framework is implemented
in the GAP 4.8.7 [41] language (due to its compatibility with the ParGAP package [11],
allowing use of MPI intra-core communication). This is tested on a case study of an AAG
KEP [2, 1] posed over polycyclic groups defined by a number field [18]. The aim is to gener-
ate mutation operators for algorithms which outperform the existing human-designed EA.
These mutation operators are chains of simple heuristics, which are composed or learned.
The generation of crossover, selection, and other heuristic components are outside the scope
of this work.
Our contribution is an approach that, contrary to the above manual design of attacks,
automatically builds attack mechanisms and attempts to break the above AAG KEP. This
approach is trained on small set of instances and then validated on a second larger inde-
pendent set of instances, illustrating it generalises. This paper is not proposing a single
algorithm to attack, but rather a framework in which algorithms can automatically be gen-
erated and then tested, and is an example of the generate-and-test paradigm which has
many applications in science, engineering, mathematics, and daily life. One of the draw-
backs of our method is the large amount of computation time required; it takes relatively
little time to generate an algorithm but a relatively long time to test it. One of the benefits
of our approach, however, is that we can take existing approaches (as we do in this paper,
an EA [43, 42]), and use it as a starting point from which we can improve.
In [13] we observed that a human-designed EA performs better than the length attack
algorithm of [18]. In this paper, we observe that an automatically designed EA performs
better than the human designed EA. We also conjecture that a random search algorithm
will perform poorly on this problem. This is a pattern of performance typically seen in
the metaheuristics literature. The reason for this ordering of four types of solver lies in
the nature of the resulting search landscape. A human designed EA is essentially a more
sophisticated length attack algorithm, and a machine-designed EA is essentially slightly
more sophisticated than an human designed EA.
Typically, during the design of an algorithm, we need an understanding of the problem
to design an algorithm. The algorithm thus capture our intuition about how to solve that
problem. (consider the problem of sorting and the large number of algorithms available, for
instance). An algorithm is an explicit formalisation of our intuition: with cryptology, we
have very little in the way of intuition to guide us. This is an opportunity for an automated
method (which is largely unbiased) to invent new algorithms.
It is acknowledged that the detailed protocol has already been broken by [13, 33] (the
latter reference being a “field attack”), but the wish is to present this work as a preliminary
study with a view towards application to other cryptanalytic problems. It is argued that
this type of algorithm has a future in the disciplines of cryptology and possibly algorithmic
questions in combinatorial group theory, and may be extended to other structures and
problem types.
This work is organised as follows: In Section 2 we give an introduction to group-based
cryptography, reviewing previously-proposed KEP problems, before turning to an overview
of hyper-heuristics. This is followed by Section 3, which introduces the notation and formal-
isation. In Section 4 we describe the experimental approach and detail parameter settings,
discussing the results of our approach in Section 5. In Section 6 we conclude the article,
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including a discussion of further work resulting from this study and raising future research
directions.
2. Background
In this section we will first introduce group-based cryptography. We then give an introduc-
tion to hyper-heuristics.
2.1. Introduction to Group-Based Cryptography. Group-based cryptography uses
groups in the construction of cryptosystems and KEPs and has been an active area of
research since approximately the late 1990s. Proposed cryptosystems and their subsequent
attacks (purported breaks) iterate one after the other with the aim of producing increasingly
secure cryptography over time.
The late nineties were when group-based cryptography began in earnest, when the likes
of [2, 1, 32] proposed KEPs based upon braid groups. As mentioned in the introduction,
the braid groups were used due to the scrambling induced by the presentation of the group,
and the consequent thought that the underlying problems (various guises of the conjugacy
problem) were thought to be extremely difficult to solve. Solving the underlying problem
would, in many cases, break the KEP and render any keys exchanged open to misuse by
adversaries.
Both KEPs, and the underlying problems, were attacked in the next few years. Example
of such attacks were super summit set attacks [17] and the more practical length-based
attacks (LBAs) [29]. These latter algorithms (also known as hillclimbers) build up solutions
to instances of the problem gradually, beginning with a short candidate solution and making
alterations to it based upon randomness. This altered solution is then compared to the
old solution by some metric, mostly with regards to how “well” the candidate solves the
instance (for example, how many symbols remain after all possible cancellations have been
conducted). If the altered solution proves to be an improvement then the current solution
is set equal to the altered solution and the process is repeated. If not, then the altered
solution is discarded.
Being practical and fast, LBAs became increasingly sophisticated through [20, 19, 34,
39]. As LBAs became also increasingly capable of solving instances of the aforementioned
KEPs, researchers began, in a search for more attack-resistant structures, to look for new
groups and problems while keeping the general methodology. Examples of these platform
groups are right-angled Artin groups [12] (a homomorphic pre-image of braid groups), small
cancellation groups [40], matrix groups, Thompson’s group and Grigorchuk’s group, to name
but a few.
Polycyclic groups were first proposed as a new platform group in 2004 [15] and were
followed ten years later by the works of [30] and [18], applying two distinct types of polycyclic
groups to the AAG [1] problem (multiple conjugacy). The systems introduced were, in
turn, broken by the works of [5] (for generalised Heisenberg groups), [33] and [13] (via a
parallelised EA). The latter work was demonstrated to be more efficient, and more successful,
than previous LBA attacks. Although the approach on the proposed KEP was successful,
we wish to take it further into the domain of hyper-heuristics and use the KEP as a test
bed for our framework. An excellent summary of group-theoretic cryptology in general can
be found in [35].
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2.2. Introduction to Hyper-Heuristics. Informally, hyper-heuristics offer to take a num-
ber of existing computational search techniques, and combine them, to make a new heuristic.
This new heuristic is intended to have more of the strengths of each of the heuristics, and less
of their weaknesses. The motive of a hyper-heuristic is not to out-perform a state-of-the-art
algorithm on a single instance of a problem. Rather, the aim of hyper-heuristic approaches
is to perform well across a range of problem instances. In other words, hyper-heuristics
attempt to offer robust performance across a set of problems rather than specialised per-
formance on a narrow set of specific instances. These problems could be problem instances
from a given domain, such as the travelling salesman problem. Or the problem instances
could be drawn from different problem domains, for example exam timetabling and vehicle
routing. In this paper we are developing a hyper-heuristic framework to solve problem
instances from a single domain: cryptology.
We should also be careful about the distinction between optimisation and supervised
machine learning. Optimisation typically has an objective function we wish to evaluate and
a parameter value which is a global optimum. Often this is difficult to achieve, and also
difficult to know when it has been achieved. In contrast, with supervised machine learning,
we typically have a set of example cases which we use to train a model. We then have a
second set of independent example cases which are used to determine if the model performs
well in general on cases which were not included in the training phase. Optimisation has a
single stage (optimising), while machine learning has two main stages (training and testing).
Nor do we have the issue of over-fitting in optimisation, but the issue of over-fitting may
arise in machine learning. In summary, in this paper we are using a machine learning
approach (hyper-heuristics), with an independent training and test set, to build a heuristic
which we used for optimisation, the objective function being to minimise the length.
Hyper-heuristics can be viewed in the context of heuristics and metaheuristics. These
three terms are often confused. Let us begin by looking first at heuristics, metaheuristics,
and finally hyper-heuristics.
A heuristic is domain-specific algorithm (often called a rule of thumb) which does
not solve a problem to optimality (as such problems are often NP-hard or NP-complete),
but rather offers to deliver suboptimal solutions in feasible time. That is, a heuristic is
a strategy that aims to deliver an approximation to a solution to a given problem in a
fast, rather than an overly elaborate, way. An example of a heuristic is the Lin-Kernighan
algorithm which is applied to the Traveling Salesman Problems (TSP). It does not make
sense to apply the Lin-Kernighan algorithm to the knapsack problem, as it is specific to TSP
problems. The Lin-Kernighan algorithm could be applied to other graph-based problems
with a representation similar to the TSP, but the algorithm may not perform well as this
is not what it was intended for. A metaheuristic is a general search-based algorithm which
can be applied to spaces consisting of bit strings or permutations, for example, depending
on the representation of the problem instances. An example of a metaheuristic is a genetic
algorithm which searches the space of bit strings of a given length.
Hyper-heuristics are different again. Typically a hyper-heuristic uses a metaheuristic
to search the space of problem specific heuristics. That is, a hyper-heuristic is a “search
methodolog[y] for choosing or generating (combining, adapting) heuristics [...], in order to
solve a range of optimisation problems” [8, p. 2]. For example, see [3]. Hyper-heuristics
have successfully been applied to a number of different problem domains.
As combinatorial optimisation problems are a subset of all NP hard problems, it is not
surprising that hyper-heuristics have been a popular approach. Applications include exam
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timetabling [4] bin packing [38] and employee rostering [10]. There have also been a number
of well-referenced survey articles, including [37, 7, 9].
Hyper-heuristics typically do not generate complete algorithms; rather a component
of an algorithm is targeted to be automatically designed by a generate and test approach.
Hyper-heuristics have been used, for example, to generate components of evolutionary algo-
rithms such as genetic algorithms and evolutionary programming (e.g., crossover operators
[21], mutation operators [27]) and form a large part of the literature in the automated design
of algorithms [26].
In the context of this paper, we are using hyper-heuristics in the following manner.
We will take seven low-level heuristics, which are chained together randomly to effectively
create new heuristics. These new chains of heuristics are then inserted into a standard EA
(depicted in the work of [13]) which is used to tackle the problem. This work begins in the
next section.
3. Notation and Formalisation
In this section, the AAG KEP over a certain type of polycyclic group is discussed. This
is followed by the notation needed for the implementation of the hyper-heuristic. In this
section, the notation broadly follows that of [13] which describes the aforementioned EA.
3.1. Setup of Problem. The AAG KEP [2, 1] was posed over polycyclic groups in [18, 30],
and subsequently attacked in two distinct ways by the work of [13] and [33]. The main details
of the protocol, following the exposition given in [13] for a group G = 〈g1, g2, . . . , gn |R〉,
are as follows.
First, Alice chooses a subgroup A = 〈a1, a2, . . . , aN 〉 ≤ G generated by words ai in the
generators of G such that L1 ≤ lG(ai) ≤ L2. Bob then does similarly to produce a subgroup
B = 〈b1, b2, . . . , dN 〉 ≤ G. All of A, B and G are made public. Alice chooses her private key
A = aǫ1µ1a
ǫ2
µ2
. . . aǫLµL where each ai ∈ A and µi = ±1 (for all i = 1, . . . , L). She now calculates
A−1b1A,A
−1b2A, . . . , A
−1bNA,
and sends these to Bob. Bob does similarly, producing B−1aiB for i = 1, . . . , N and sends
these to Alice (his private key is B). From the information now exchanged, each individual
can now produce the shared key (the commutator) [A,B] = A−1B−1AB.
If an adversary wishes to find either the private key A (or equivalently, B), they may
intercept the above conjugates either party sends to the other. Thus the problem to be
solved may be simply expressed as a subgroup restricted multiple conjugacy problem in the
following way. Each instance of this problem is a set of N (frequently twenty) conjugacy
equations E = {E1, . . . , EN}
E1 : c1 = A
−1biA
E2 : c2 = A
−1biA
. . .
EN : cN = A
−1bNA,
posed over a finitely presented platform group G. A solution to the problem means that all
the above equations are satisfied. One function of the rewriting rules (relators) R of G is to
serve cryptographically as word obfuscators and thus hide the secret word (private key) A.
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The problem is posed over polycyclic groups O ⋊ U , where, by [13], O is the additive
group of the ring of integers of a number field K and its group of units is U . The number
field is written as K = Q[x]/(f), for f ∈ Z[x] a monic irreducible polynomial of degree d.
To recap, the instance parameters associated to this setup are then the number of equations,
N , the polynomial f , length L of the private key A in A, and L1 and L2 (the lower and
upper bounds, respectively, on the lengths of ai in G).
Note that, in this work, we refer to either an exact solution or a candidate solution
as appropriate. However, most references will be to candidate solutions but for the sake
of brevity will be named solutions. In the context of hyper-heuristics and cryptology, we
are using hyper-heuristics to generate candidate solutions to find an exact solution to the
cryptographic problem. In this spirit, there are several functions at work in this paper
which we need to distinguish between.
3.2. Pertinent Functions. The following functions are recapped from [13]. Let a word w
be expressed in the form w = f
ei1
i1
f
ei2
i2
. . . f
eir
ir
for non-zero ej ∈ Z and f1, f2, . . ., fn are the
generators of the free group F . The length functions associated to the group G are then
given by
ℓ (w) =
r∑
k=1
|eik |
and
ℓwt (w) =
r∑
k=1
ωik |eik |,
where, as in the above, ωj is the “sum of the lengths of the normal forms of the commutators
[gj , gk] in G for k = 1, . . . , n”. That is, the length of w is the sum of the absolute powers
(respectively, the weighted absolute powers) of individual generators fi that make up the
word w.
The basic EA cost function measures the quality of the candidate solutions produced
by the EA and is given by
c (w) =
N∑
i=1
ℓ
(
α−1biαc
−1
i
)
,
where α is the current EA solution (i.e., the approximation of the private key A). This
function has output of the sum of lengths of (normal form) reduced equations E1, E2, . . . , EN .
That is, the length of summand i (where i ∈ {1, . . . , N}) of the cost function is equal to the
reduced length of each equation Ei after its substitution with α. This function is used to
drive search in the EA, since the population ranking is performed with respect to it. The
cost used in the EA is broadly the cost vector produced by this basic function, involving the
sum c, maximum and mean lengths of summands of c for the weighted and non-weighted
length functions, given in [13, p. 8–9]. The global optimum (minimum value) of c is zero;
at this value, no fragments of the equations remain and the instance is completely solved.
The heuristic objective function is the metric used to compare the current heuristic chain
over the given set of instances (training or testing) and is a vector given in the following
order, each element computed over the set of instances:
• The mean best cost c over the unsuccessful EA runs;
• The negative of the success rate as a proportion of the total number of runs;
• From the successful runs, the mean number of generations used by the EA.
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That is, this function tells the hyper-heuristic how good a given heuristic chain is. For
the validation process the first and second elements of the above objective function are
swapped, since we are now more concerned with the success rate. The hyper-heuristic
attempts to minimise the above objective function, indicating a successful heuristic chain,
as far as possible. Comparison of heuristic objective vectors, produced by two distinct
heuristic chains, is performed lexicographically. Note that this function is often termed a
fitness function in the evolutionary computation community.
3.3. Simple Heuristics on the Group. In previous work [13], six simple heuristics were
used in an EA to break a proposed key exchange [18]. These are listed in Table 1 as H1–
H6. In this paper, we are building new heuristic chains to inject into an EA. We have also
added a seventh heuristic H7 (swap) to this set of heuristics. Evolutionary operators may
be otherwise thought of as heuristic on group elements w = f
ei1
i1
f
ei2
i2
. . . f
eir
ir
.
Heuristic Description
H1 insertion of a subgroup generator ai
H2 insertion of a single generator fi
H3 deletion of a single generator
H4 substitution with a single generator
H5 position conjugation: conjugating a given position by fi
H6 subword conjugation: conjugating a subword by fi
H7 swap
Table 1: The seven simple heuristics used to build new heuristics. The first six heuristics
were used in [13].
Heuristic H7 (swap) is designed to assist when symbols are in the ‘wrong place’ in
a word w, swapping two symbols at random positions and potentially trigger subsequent
cancellation of symbols (and, thus, an EA cost reduction). Essentially all heuristics in the
above table are random, with operations performed with random words or generators at
random positions. The above is not a list of minimal heuristics: it is noted, for example,
that heuristic H1 can be achieved through repeated application of H2, as can H5 and H6
(which were specialised to the conjugacy problem).
3.4. EA Parameter Settings. The EA parameters are given in Table 2. The parameters
were produced by copious experimentation, and scaling down the parameters in [13] to ap-
proximately one quarter of their original values to achieve an effective set of EA parameters.
This increases the speed of the EA. The original population size was 100. We do not claim
optimality for these parameter settings.
All heuristics are performed by firstly choosing a solution at random from the top 40%
of the population (by cost). The selection operator is elitist; i.e., if ns solutions are to be
selected then the first is the solution of minimum cost with the remaining ns − 1 solutions
selected from the top 40% (i.e., after ranking by minimum cost) of the population at random.
All random choices are made uniformly (as in [13]).
It was chosen to have four solutions from each generation created by a heuristic chain.
Testing this alongside the remaining nineteen solutions in each generation created by the
same heuristic chain, it was found that this choice of four solutions turned out to be more
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Parameter Value
population size 25
truncation selection 40%
H1 6
H2 1
H3 1
H4 5
H5 1
H6 1
crossover 4
selection 2
chains 4
number of generations depends on experiment
Table 2: EA parameter settings.
advantageous (the average number of generations to solve decreased). H7 does not appear
in Table 2 as it does not operate in isolation (as part of the EA of [13]), only in the context
of the other six heuristics. Crossover is performed by choosing two words (from the top 40%
of the population) w1, w2. Choosing two random positive integers r1 ≤ ℓ(w1), r2 ≤ ℓ(w2),
one of the two words
w1[1 . . . r1]w2[r2 + 1 . . . ℓ(w2)] and w2[1 . . . r2]w1[r1 + 1 . . . ℓ(w1)]
is output [13] (where w[s . . . t] is the subword between and including positions s and t of the
word w). The next section details the operation of the hyper-heuristic and the experimental
setup.
4. Experimental Setup
4.1. Hyper-heuristic Implementation. As above, our objective is to create a hyper-
heuristic that, given the AAG problem (Section 3.1) and a polycyclic group as previously
stated, generates an algorithm which solves an acceptable number of instances of the prob-
lem. The term “acceptable” in this instance is taken to mean a higher number of instances
than the original EA of [13] with H2 inserted (cf. ‘H2’ column of Tables 3–5 given later).
To recap, our hyper-heuristic controls the injection of heuristic chains into an EA in order
to determine the best heuristic chain. The initial heuristic chain can be the best heuristic
known (i.e., H2) or a random chain. If the initial heuristic chain is random, then the heuris-
tic generator is called. This random chain is set to a random length between 2 and 10. We
now present the core algorithmic contribution and how these algorithms are related. Algo-
rithm 1 tests heuristic chains; the parameters used are Hmax = 20, Ntrain = 15, Ntest = 50
and Nvalid = 50.
The EA referred to in Algorithm 1 is the EA of [13] run on an input collection of
instances. The EA parameter values are reduced as in Table 2. Note also that there is a
probability, ph, that the current chain will be accepted if it does not perform better than
the best chain found (on the training instances) so far.
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Algorithm 1 Heuristic generation and testing methodology
Input: Group G; parameters: number of training instances Ntrain; number of testing
instances Ntest; number of validation instances Nvalid; initial heuristic chain; maximum
number, Cmax, of heuristics to generate.
Output: Runtime statistics; best heuristic chain found.
1: i∗ ← 0, i← 1
2: while i ≤ Cmax do
3: if i = 1 then
4: Ci ← initial chain
5: else
6: Call heuristic chain generator (Algorithm 2), giving chain Ci.
7: end if
8: Execute the EA, with injected chain Ci on all training instances.
⊲ Get metric Mi,train on training set.
9: if i = 1 then
10: Mtrain∗ ←Mi,train, i
∗ ← i
11: else
12: if Mi,train < Mtrain∗ then ⊲ Better chain found for training set;
test chain on the testing set.
13: Execute the EA, with injected chain Ci on all test instances.
⊲ Get metric Mi,test.
14: If M1,test does not exist then execute the EA with injected chain
C1 on all testing instances. Let M
∗
test ←M1,test.
15: if Mi,test < M
∗
test then
16: i∗ ← i ⊲ A better chain has been found on the testing set.
17: end if
18: else
19: Accept chain Ci (i.e., i
∗ ← i ) with probability ph.
⊲ Otherwise rewind chain back to the last best chain.
20: end if
21: end if
22: end while
23: if i∗ 6= 1 then
24: Compare chain Cp with chain C1 on the validation set of instances
via execution of the EA with injected chains (i) Cp and (ii) C1.
25: return timeout and Ci∗. End.
26: end if
The group definition of G is a piece of code which simply defines the group, its instance
parameters over which the instance will be computed, and the cost functions. Next is the
heuristic chain generator, Algorithm 2. If the initial heuristic chain is a random chain,
then this random chain is created by appending a given number (here, a random number
between two and ten) of simple heuristics randomly chosen from H1–H7. Otherwise, the
heuristic generator (Algorithm 2) generates new chains of simple heuristics from the chain
given by the current step of Algorithm 1 by a process of insertion, deletion or substitution
at random positions in the heuristic chain. The heuristic is then returned in the form of a
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series of commands written into a file read by the EA when it is time to execute the chain.
Chains not allowed include the set of all chains of the form Hk3 for some k > 0 (i.e., a chain
consisting solely of deletions) or chains that are identical to those already examined in the
hyper-heuristic run. We let pi = ps = 0.4 and pd = 0.2.
Algorithm 2 Heuristic chain generator
Input: Set of heuristic chains C = {C1, . . . , Ck} already examined.
Output: New heuristic chain C ′.
C ′ ← Ci, the heuristic chain given by Algorithm 1.
1: while C ′ ∈ C do
Choose operation at random subject to probabilities pi, ps, pd (of insertion, substitution
and deletion respectively).
Perform chosen operation on C ′ with a simple heuristic chosen at random from H1–H7
(if not deletion).
2: end while
3: return heuristic chain C ′. End.
An instance generator is also used. This creates instances at random, with random
number seed based upon the computer clock. Included are instance parameters (N , ℓ, L1,
L2, G - Section 3.1), a random word function, and the cost functions as in Section 3.1.
4.2. Details of Implementation. During early development of the hyper-heuristic, issues
with speed were noted. A number of measures were put into place to increase processing
speed. Firstly, an EA population size of 25 was used (with one slave processor being assigned
to each population member). In addition, smaller EA iteration limits than [13] were set.
On the training and testing instances, ‘maxsteps’ is set to 50 for degrees 1, 2 and 3 of the
polynomial f defining the number field K (which, of course, defines G), and 100 for degrees
5 and 7. On the validation instances, ‘maxsteps’ is set to 1250 for degrees 1, 2, and 3, and
2500 for degrees 5 and 7); this had the effect of a small decrease in the success rate of the EA
compared to that of [13] (and so the results are not directly comparable). The polynomials
f used for the above degrees were x− 1, x2− x− 1, x3− x− 1, x5− x3− 1 and x7− x3− 1,
being consistent with those of [18, 13].
All instances are run with an initial word length of 10 generators (in EA generation 1)
to avoid bias to the insertion operators which would occur with an initial length of 1 (for
example). No instances of degree 9 or above were attempted due to the time complexity of
computation and reduction of words in the groups concerned (for more details the interested
reader should consult [13]). The number of instances used in each phase of the hyper-
heuristic were fifteen (training), fifty (testing) and fifty (validation). The number of heuristic
chains run by the hyper-heuristic is Hmax = 20.
All experiments were run on a high-performance cluster containing Intel Xeon E5620
CPU processors, each running at 2.40 GHz. The hyper-heuristic was implemented in the
GAP language [41], and the Polycyclic [16] package for GAP was used for computation
with polycyclic group elements. The ParGAP [11] package was also used to handle MPI
communications between processors. Due to the domain, the popular hyper-heuristic pack-
ages such as Hyflex [36] are not suitable for use because we are using GAP, a specialist
group theory language. As above, each experiment was run on 26 cores (1 ‘master’ core to
control, and 25 ‘slave’ cores, one for each EA population member). The code referred to
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in this section is available from https://github.com/MJCraven/Hyperheuristic_group,
with the instances available at [14].
5. Experimental Results
In this section, hyper-heuristic experiments are run, varying initial input and instance
parameters. To recap, the EA with the heuristic chains injected is then executed on the
previously detailed fifteen training instances. If the performance improves over that of
previous heuristic chains then it is run with the testing set (fifty random instances). If the
performance over this set improves over that of previous heuristic chains then the current
chain is assigned as the new best chain. This is continued until the end of the run, after which
the chain is validated over the validation set of (a distinct set of) fifty random instances.
For a single hyper-heuristic run, for each of twenty heuristic chains and, assuming at least
one better heuristic chain is found, around 500 problem instances are run are total.
5.1. The Best Simple Heuristic. A LBA attack (i.e., a hillclimber) was created for
each simple heuristic. These attacks were run on a selection of random instances, with
the percentage of successful runs as 1.7%, 51.7%, 0%, 0%, 1.7% and 1.7% respectively for
H1-H6. This indicates that a heuristic on its own, unless it builds appropriate solutions, is
unlikely to be successful for a large set of random instances. In this case, H2 seems to be
more successful since it builds solutions by gradually increasing solution length. Hence, the
hyper-heuristic is initialised with the chain composed solely of a single execution of H2.
5.2. Observations on the Evolution to Build Heuristic Chains. The following details
are presented for each experiment. The first column of Tables 3–5 is the degree of the
polynomial f , one of the main instance parameters. The second column is the validation
set metric (success rate, mean cost from unsuccessful runs, mean number of generations
from successful runs to solve the instance) from the EA with the best known heuristic chain
(insertion - H2). The third column is the validation set metric from the EA with best
injected heuristic chain found, followed by the iteration on which the best heuristic chain
was found. The fifth column gives the chain, where Hki refers to k repeated executions of
heuristic Hi. The last column is the number of hyper-heuristic runs it took to find the
best heuristic; unsuccessful runs were those for which either either no better chain than
H2 was found, or, more commonly a better chain (on the grounds of testing and training
performance) was found but performed worse than H2 on the validation set.
d Insertion (H2) GA with Chain Iter Best Chain # Runs
1 [100%, 0, 7.88] [100%, 0, 7.62] 6 H2H1H4 4
2 [100%, 0, 157.08] [100%, 0, 96.04] 2 H2H7 1
3 [100%, 0, 101.84] [100%, 0, 81.54] 16 H5H
2
3
H7H2H5 2
5 [60%, 299.55, 491.23] [66%, 329.53, 695.39] 10 H3H7 6
7 [32%, 476.44, 785.94] [42%, 557.90, 854.05] 6 H6H3H7 1
Table 3: Comparison of results on fifty validation instances. The parameters used were
N = 20, L1 = 10, L2 = 13, L = 5, as in Section 4.1. Those instances used by the
present work are taken from the same distributions as those used by [13].
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d Insertion (H2) GA with Chain Iter Best Chain # Runs
1 [100%, 0, 3.92] [100%, 0, 3.60] 15 H7H1H2 12
2 [100%, 0, 38.30] [100%, 0, 32.68] 18 H2H3 1
3 [100%, 0, 80] [100%, 0, 66.60] 5 H2H1H2H4 1
5 [76%, 25.67, 501.47] [92%, 20.75, 488.26] 13 H7H3H2H1H5H4H7H5 1
7 [58%, 37.33, 585.34] [66%, 41.29, 497.39] 7 H5H2H7H
2
3 6
Table 4: Comparison of results on fifty validation instances. The parameters used were
N = 5, L1 = 5, L2 = 8, L = 5.
d Insertion (H2) GA with Chain Iter Best Chain # Runs
1 [100%, 0, 7.30] [100%, 0, 7.02] 9 H4
5
H4H1 3
2 [96%, 35, 141.25] [98%, 29, 163.51] 3 H2H7 4
3 [92%, 37.5, 180.54] [96%, 37, 160.33] 20 H3H
2
5
H3H5H3H1H5H6 1
5 [52%, 617.17, 577.38] [58%, 141.33, 888.03] 8 H6H3H4H1 2
7 [12%, 344.64, 947.5] [18%, 289.76, 1115.89] 13 H24H5H6H7H3H2 2
Table 5: Comparison of results on fifty validation instances. The parameters used were
N = 5, L1 = 15, L2 = 18, L = 5.
Some observations on the results are noted in the next subsection.
5.3. Observations and Discussion of Results. Demonstrated through Tables 3–5, it is
clear that the approach enables the creation of more successful heuristic chains than the EA
of [13]. Since the hyper-heuristic relies on a stochastic algorithm (the EA), some runs are
more successful than others. For example, some hyper-heuristic runs may uncover several
chains proving more successful than the initial heuristic chain (e.g., Table 4 with d = 7).
On the other hand, however, some hyper-heuristic runs may discover no chains at all that
are more effective than the initial heuristic (recall this information is recorded in the final
column of Tables 3–5). This latter conclusion seems to be more common for d = 1 where a
high percentage of instances are solved by the EA with the initial heuristic H2.
Note, in addition, that for many small d (e.g., d = 1 or d = 2), all problem instances are
solved by the EA with the injected simple heuristic H2. Thus, the only option to improve
performance, in the sense it is measured in this work, is to solve those instances in a smaller
mean number of generations. For example, the degree d = 1 on Table 3, shows that 100% of
problem instances are solved by the initial heuristic in a mean of 7.88 generations. This is
improved marginally, solving all instances with a mean of 7.62 generations by the later chain
H2H1H4. This suggests that for larger d ≥ 5, for example, more ’room for improvement’ is
possible by the hyper-heuristic.
As is often the case with EAs and hyper-heuristics, high performance computing is an
advantage due to the large amounts of time required to solve a large number of instances.
The parameter with the largest influence is the degree d (see [13] for further details). All
the above results exhibit an improvement over the results of [13] (and so [18]). By the above
results, there do not seem to be patterns formed in the best heuristic found and so it is
probable that there do not exist chains that work better for one particular degree.
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5.4. Characteristics of the Framework. Through experience, and by the above analysis,
some characteristics of the framework (in the context of the AAG problem and polycyclic
groups defined by a number field) are observed.
First, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, random instances have not been classified
in terms of difficulty. For example, an EA that solved instance A of a problem in an average
of 3000 generations (over, say, ten repetitions) may well solve instance B, with the same
instance parameters, in 100 generations. That is, for a given set of instance parameters (N ,
L, L1 and L2) there is a large variability in difficulty for randomly-generated problems. In
the experience of the authors, this effect seems to worsen for higher degrees. Recall that L
is the key length in the subgroup A ≤ G. Due to the lengths L1 and L2 (in G) of elements in
A ≤ G the length of the key may be rather large after mapping to its image in G. Combined
with the relator lengths in the presentations of the groups, this makes problem hardness
difficult to classify. This imposes a constraint on the hyper-heuristic, since a consistent
measure of performance over a small number of instances is difficult to obtain. Hence, a
relatively large number of instances are needed, at least on the testing and validation.
Combinatorial optimisation problems typically have an objective function where, when
a small change is made to the input, there is a correspondingly small change in the output
value. This is reflected in the so-called “deep-valley hypothesis” [25]. This property is
often assumed when metaheuristics are applied, as metaheuristics typically make a small
change to the solution in order to bring about a small improvement in the objective values.
However, the objective function in this paper is, because of the group presentations used,
unlikely to display the deep-valley property and this means that the feedback provided by
a more rugged “landscape” does not guide the search as efficiently. This is manifested by
a heuristic chain having a low success rate on the training instances but also having a high
success rate on the testing instances, or vice-versa.
Hyper-heuristics may be applied to continuous optimisation problems, where real-valued
feedback from the objective function may guide the search process. The situation is more
complex for the current optimiser since the objective value is discrete: that is, the optimiser
has either solved a given instance or it has not. This work goes some way to ameliorate
this issue by including the least EA cost reached as part of the performance metric. The
hyper-heuristic is hill-climbing in the space of heuristic chains. In the next section, the
paper is concluded.
6. Concluding remarks
This work exhibits the automatic generation of novel heuristic chains to improve an existing
EA which has previously been demonstrated to effectively attack a given KEP. That is, this
approach is a framework for learning (i.e., generating and testing in a hyper-heuristics
setting) cryptanalytic attacks. We are not proposing a single algorithm to tackle this
problem as many previous papers have done. Our stance is distinctly different: we propose
a framework to automatically generate algorithms for the attack. One of the advantages
of this approach is that it automates the rather mechanical task of generating new attack
algorithms for which there are often few design principles to guide us. This is thus an ideal
match for a generative hyper-heuristics approach where novel algorithms can be freely and
easily generated. This avoids the task of manually generating algorithms for which we often
have scant means of evaluating their effectiveness other than actually testing them out on
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problems of interest. An evaluation metric is all a hyper-heuristic need to produce new
heuristic chains. This article makes the following key contributions to the field:
(1) the proposal that hyper-heuristics is a suitable framework in which to generate and test
heuristic chains to break a KEP.
(2) the implementation and application of a hyper-heuristic to automatically build chains
of simple heuristics to break a given KEP.
(3) the demonstration that chains of simple heuristics trained on one set of problem in-
stances can then generalise to solve a second independent set of problem instances.
In the realms of further work, we would like to generalise the hyper-heuristic framework
to work towards proving or disproving security of proposed group-theoretic KEPs. The
framework exhibited is expandable, enabling other groups and group-theoretic problems to
be used. Possible other uses could be to show that some proposed KEPs prove resistant to
LBA attacks (that is, KEPs for which the hyper-heuristic does not yield high-performing
heuristic chains after many runs). For example, would the conjugacy search problem in
finitely generated metabelian groups or generalised metabelian Baumslag-Solitar groups
[24] be breakable (the authors in a preprint suggest that LBA algorithms are ineffective)
with the approach? Similarly, would the n-root and subgroup membership search problems
in polycyclic groups [23], or the conjugacy problem and hidden subgroup problem in Engel
groups [31], be breakable? Further, by [22], there are open questions related to complexity
of some problems in polycyclic groups (power conjugacy problem, geodesic length problem,
n-root problem, or the subgroup membership search problem) or other problems that may
be used in KEPs. The complexity of the above problems may be analysed using the hyper-
heuristic framework, potentially giving further information about the exact solutions of
these problems (if they exist).
A final area is of determining the effectiveness of using the hyper-heuristic for very
high parameter settings across general group-theoretic problems. In this sense, the hyper-
heuristic approach would prove very slow (since, by the experience of the authors, the vast
majority of runtime tends to spent evaluating the EA cost function) and thus research into
surrogate cost function approaches would be of interest [6].
It is hoped this work may encourage machine learning and hyper-heuristic approaches in
cryptology. This may have an impact upon post-quantum cryptography, with such problems
as the hidden subgroup problem ripe for the attack [28]. If the approach is effective, then
it confirms a given problem combined with a platform group is breakable, whereas if it is
not effective then this may provide further evidence to validate as “quantum-safe” proposed
cryptographic structures.
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